Xu Wang

Hope as Atmosphere

An Existential-phenomenological and Intercultural Study into the Phenomenon of Hope

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Christina Aus der Au, Celia Deane-Drummond, Agustín Fuentes, Jan-Olav Henriksen, and Markus Mühling

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Introduction

This thesis explores the meaning of hope in the language of atmosphere. Generally speaking, it belongs to the existential-phenomenological endeavor of interpreting hope as existentially fundamental. Following the anthropologist Tim Ingold's insights in his concept of atmosphere and the Chinese neo-Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai (张载)'s philosophy of *qi* (气), fundamental hope is formulated as a hopeful co-existence in the conceptual constellation of atmospheric co-existence, meshwork, in-between, resonance, and void. So understood, hope not only gains new meaning and metaphor within the Western context but also finds expression in other contexts. As this thesis will present, it can also find anchorage and expression in Confucian central doctrine of *ren* (仁, co-humanity), which is usually claimed to be devoid of the discourse of hope.

As a human phenomenon, hope is not merely situated at the margin, beginning or end, but in the midst of our everyday life.[1] In human life, hope is found everywhere. For example, the hope for something desirable to happen, the hope in you as the one who I can trust, and the hope with other companions together. These different forms of hope cannot simply be packed into a formula, because hope is a complex human phenomenon that has many interwoven aspects and layers of meaning. Indeed, as Karl Woschitz claims, "a concept in each case is the focal point (*Konvexpunkt*) of a variety of historical experiences and thing-affair-relations (*Sachbezüge*)."[2]

In the Western context, the current usage of the concept of hope is a mixture of both human hope and Christian theological hope.[3] On the one hand, in the Western philosophical tradition, the concept of hope is highly ambiguous and controversial. It is sometimes powerful and sometimes weak, sometimes positive and sometimes deceptive, it sometimes consists of passive waiting and sometimes of resistant act, sometimes with a clear aim and sometimes merely a personal disposition, sometimes individual and sometimes social. Besides these tensions in this concept, there are also various competing theories regarding the basic status of hope and its value. Moreover, everyday hope seems to be always entangled with other phenomena such as wish, desire, fear, imagination, belief, expectation,

1 See Ingolf U. Dalferth, *Hoffnung* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 43.

2 Karl M. Woschitz, *Elpis, Hoffnung: Geschichte, Philosophie, Exegese, Theologie eines Schlüsselbegriffs* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1979), 335.

3 See Karl Lehmann, "Gegen Hoffnung in Hoffnung. Ihre anthropologischen und theologischen Grundlagen," in *Die Kunst des Hoffens: Kranksein zwischen Erschütterung und Neuorientierung*, ed. Giovanni Maio (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2016), 7–37, 8.

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trust, and optimism, making it all the more difficult to formulate an unambiguous understanding of hope philosophically.

On the other hand, Christian theology offers a very well-formed and clear concept of hope within the constellation of the triune God, Christian eschatology, salvation, and promise. To speak generally, in Christian theology, hope is theologically rooted and anthropologically fundamental. As one of the three theological virtues that reveal the fundamental connection between human existence and God, hope serves as a central concept in Christian doctrine.

In contrast to the fundamental significance that Christian theology attributes to hope, the dominant assumption in Western philosophical history is that hope is peripheral to human existence and to reality as a whole. That is to say, although hope is everywhere within our everyday life, it is only a decorative phenomenon, sometimes helpful and enthusing, sometimes blind and poisonous, but is never profound enough to decide what human being is and has no bearing on truth and reality. Accordingly, hope is only treated in passing. As Paul Ricoeur claims, "hope does not primarily belong to philosophical discourse; the theologians of the past were right when they call it a 'theological virtue' – along with faith and love."[4] However, among various philosophical approaches, the existential-phenomenological approach stands out and takes hope as a fundamental and central human experience. In this scope, hope is fundamental for human *Dasein* in relation to an inexhaustive and bearing reality.

In summary, hope is unambiguously fundamental to human existence in the Christian theological context, while understood philosophically, it can be either peripheral or fundamental. Therefore, in philosophical understanding, a distinction between ordinary hopes and fundamental hope can be made. Ordinary hopes are those common ones that pass by without much bearing on our essential identity, reality, and Being, whereas fundamental hope is constitutive and decisive for them.

This thesis also follows this distinction and focuses mainly on fundamental hope. In this thesis, fundamental hope is expounded as hopeful co-existence – a fundamental existential mode of in-betweenness, which finds its proper expression in atmospheric co-existence and atmospheric reality. Concretely speaking, it is our conscious and persistent enactment of atmospheric co-existence that finds orientation in an atmospheric reality.

4 Paul Ricoeur, "Hope and the Structure of Philosophical Systems," in *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination*, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 203–216, 204. Regarding this point, Schumacher also argues that "as a topic for study, hope has largely been left to psychologists and theologians. For the most part philosophers treat hope *en passant*." Bernard N. Schumacher, *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), xi.

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It is worth noting that although fundamental hope is expressed in this thesis as the short formula of *hopeful co-existence*, it cannot be tidily pressed into one single formula in principle. Fundamental hope is a *concrete complex* in its core.[5] It consists of a constellation of meaning that has many equiprimordial characteristics, for example, open temporality, the possibility of good, gift, and intersubjectivity. Situated in different theoretical contexts with different concerns, the meaning of fundamental hope is also differently arranged with different basic characteristic(s) highlighted. In this sense, it invites a pluralistic understanding based on different basic characteristic(s) in principle. This thesis presents an interpretation of fundamental hope with a particular stress on in-betweenness. In the meanwhile, it also holds that there are other formulas of fundamental hope with emphasis on other basic features.[6]

Therefore, this thesis explores hope neither comprehensively as an exhibition of various types of hope, nor in a reductionistic way, claiming that there is one single version of fundamental hope from which every other understanding and form of hope is derived. Rather, it investigates into its basic characteristic of in-betweenness and offers a conceptual constellation regarding this characteristic, that is, hope in the language of atmospheric co-existence and atmospheric reality.

In this thesis, two major threads – the existential-phenomenological and the inter-cultural – hold the arguments together.

Firstly, fundamental hope can be put in the existential-phenomenological background and understood as one of the fundamental existential modes of human *Dasein*. In the existential phenomenology conceived by Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time*, human existence is not traced back to any form of substance but is disclosed in existentiality – a coherent structure of different possible modes "to be."[7] Following this insight, this thesis holds that hope is also one of the possible modes of *Dasein*. However, since Heidegger claims that every existential possibility is inevitably "always-being-mine (*jemeinig*)," he presents a self-centered existentiality that cannot do justice to the relational structure of fundamental hope. Thus it requires another existential framework for fundamental hope, which is found

5 The terminology of *concrete complex* is borrowed from Kuang-Ming Wu, *On the "Logic" of Togetherness: A Cultural Hermeneutic* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 405.

6 For example, Ingolf Dalferth defines hope as "our sense of the gift of the possibility of the good (*unser Sinn für die Gabe der Möglichkeit des Guten*)," Marcel expresses hope in the formula of hope "in thee – for us," and Bollnow says that hope is the decisive determination of the "inner temporal structure of human life." See Dalferth, *Hoffnung*, 5, Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, trans. Emma Craufurd (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951), 60, and Otto F. Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit: das Problem einer Überwindung des Existentialismus* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011), 79.

7 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 17th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993), 12.

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in Gabriel Marcel's phenomenology of hope.[8] For Marcel, fundamental hope is essentially a hope for *us*, which implies an intersubjective ontology.

Moreover, intersubjectivity finds a more proper and detailed expression in the concept of atmosphere. In Tim Ingold's concept of air-centered atmosphere, human existence becomes a de-centered dynamic co-existence that happens in the form of sentient and creative inner touch. This form of co-existence is not traced back to any sense of "mineness" but is thought of in terms of in-betweenness. That is to say, atmospheric co-existence is not primarily an existential mode of a singular *Dasein*, but that of *Daseins* that exist in-between and exist together as a living meshwork. Inspired by Ingold, this thesis argues that atmospheric co-existence discloses an existentiality of in-betweenness against Heidegger's self-centered one, which provides a more proper existential context for fundamental hope.

Secondly, fundamental hope is also expounded in an inter-cultural context. First, Christian theological hope constitutes a crucial source for the understanding of fundamental hope. Instead of executing a phenomenological reduction on theological hope, this thesis focuses on how the triune God as the basis of Christian hope reveals a living relational structure, which enriches the understanding of in-betweenness and hopeful co-existence in a concrete and unique way. Moreover, in resonance with the atmospheric understanding of hope, Christian hope can also find an alternative expression as resonance and interpenetration between two pieces of meshwork, that is, the divine way of hopeful co-existence and human way of hopeful co-existence.

Second, this thesis also brings the Chinese philosophy of *qi* (气) and Confucian tradition of *ren* (仁, co-humanity) into play. In this thesis, atmospheric co-existence is essentially complemented by neo-Confucian scholar Zhang Zai's philosophy of *qi*. To be concrete, the concepts of resonance (*gan*感), Great Void (*taixu* 太虚) and Way of Great Harmony (*taihe zhidao*太和之道) in Zhang Zai's philosophy of *qi* are introduced as important theoretical resources for an atmospheric reality. While the concept of resonance is similar to Ingold's sentient and creative inner touch, the concepts of Great Void and Way of Great Harmony reveal a breathable and extending atmospheric reality of in-betweenness. Moreover, in this thesis, the central Confucian doctrine of *ren* (仁, co-humanity) is also introduced as a concrete way of human hopeful co-existence, which begins from an everyday situation of resonant compassion and extends into a refreshing roomy sphere of a universal body.

It is important to emphasize that Christian hope and Confucian *ren* (仁, co-humanity) are not two concrete examples of a formal structure of hopeful co-

8 See Gabriel Marcel, "Sketch of Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Hope," in *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, trans. Emma Craufurd (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965), 29–67.

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existence; this thesis is not merely a pure phenomenological effort to make sense of hope for human existence *as such*. In this thesis, the trinitarian basis of Christian hope, the Confucian doctrine of co-humanity, and atmospheric co-existence are three concrete narratives in communication, and the understanding of fundamental hope as hopeful co-existence is a fruit of this communication, rather than an abstract philosophical structure that waits for the support of concrete examples.

Finally, interpreting fundamental hope in the language of atmosphere also brings some "fresh air" to both Western and Chinese understandings of hope. Within the Western context, this interpretation brings an alternative metaphor for hope other than light. As will be expounded in detail in Chapter 5, this atmosphere metaphor avoids many of the disadvantages that the light metaphor connotes. In the Chinese context, this interpretation belongs to the endeavor of doing philosophy in its own metaphors.[9] Since Chinese thought is fundamentally air-based (which is manifest in the Chinese philosophy of *qi*), hope in the language of atmosphere becomes more accessible to those who live in Chinese tradition.

9 In his book *A Theology of Dao*, the Korean theologian Heup Young Kim uses the East Asian philosophical concept of *dao* to interpret Christian theology and considers it an endeavor of "doing theology in our own metaphors." In this respect, this thesis shares his insight. See Heup Young Kim, *A Theology of Dao* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2017), X.

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1. Philosophical Understandings of Hope

This chapter is a brief introduction to the current philosophical understandings of hope. As briefly pointed out in the Introduction above, in the Western philosophical tradition, the concept of hope is ambiguous and complicated. Accordingly, it can be interpreted in different directions and with different approaches. For example, hope can be analytically understood as a desire and probability assignment,[1] rationally judged as ignorant, illusional, superfluous or even poisonous,[2] and existentially established as one of the fundamental possibilities of human existence.[3] Moreover, hope can also be attributed to some regions of the human mind, to the probability of the objects that are hoped for, to various external factors, and to some power that transcends both the subject and the object. Finally, hope can reveal its meaning in comparison to the relevant or antonymous phenomena such as desire, wish, optimism, expectation, trust, *Angst*, and despair.[4]

In this chapter, these relations and approaches are not presented in detail. In brief, this thesis shows that in the Western philosophical context, the interpretations of hope are inevitably more or less subject to its grammatical system. Specifically, hope can be divided into a subjective side and an objective side, and it can be further allocated to a certain part of speech (such as a noun, verb, and adjective) (1.1). Moreover, this thesis argues that there is a basic distinction between ordinary hopes and fundamental hope, and that fundamental hope should be understood as a fundamental human *existential* of living hopefully that makes human life humane (1.2). Furthermore, in this chapter, the ontological presuppositions of hope are also presented in two models – the subject-object model and the communal model. In the subject-object model, hope is characterized by a relation of having, a logic of lacking, a self-center, and an extrapolatory and closed temporality. In the communal model, hope is characterized by a relation of Being, a logic of superabundance, ex-centricity, gift, and an open and rhythmic temporality (1.3).

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1 For an introduction to this understanding see Ariel Meirav, "The Nature of Hope," *Ratio* 22, no. 2 (June 2009): 216–233.

2 These judgments are expounded, for example, by Dalferth. See Ingolf U. Dalferth, *Hoffnung* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 11–16.

3 This approach will be introduced in detail in Chapter 2.

4 See for example, Otto F. Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit: Das Problem Einer Überwindung Des Existentialismus* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011), 102–109, Alois Edmaier, *Horizonte der Hoffnung* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1968), 82–115, and Bernard N. Schumacher, *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 66–88.

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1.1 Grammar of Hope

1.1.1 The Objective Side of Hope

Hope, in this case, refers to what is hoped for; it is *spes, quae speratur*. This *spes quae* has a wide spectrum of meaning that ranges from most ordinary things and events[5] to some final aims in realms such as politics, art, and religion.[6] It may include some very specific objects, objectives, events, outlooks, and prospects, or the more vague ones that are expressed in "the good" or "something more."

When *spes quae* refers to daily ordinary objects or events, they are usually trivial and fleeting. These ordinary ones are subject to change according to situations and can be easily substituted without influencing the being of the one who hopes. For example, I invite a friend to a casual dinner. I hope that his train will not be late, so that he will arrive here on time and the soup will still be hot. When he comes on time, I cease hoping for it, quickly forget this thing I hoped for, and begin to focus on other things, such as hoping my guest will enjoy the dessert. Besides this daily usage, *spes quae* can also refer to some final aim that has an inner relationship with being and reality, for example final salvation or *summum bonum*.

According to Aquinas' classic definition, the formal object of hope is an agreeable future good, difficult but possible to obtain.[7] Following this definition, Alois Edmaier holds that there are three basic features of *spes quae*, that is, relation to the future, the good, and uncertainty.[8]

This thesis shares Edmaier's idea of three basic features of *spes quae*. First, what is hoped for has a relationship to the future. As Edmaier points out, this future-relation belongs to the oldest content of the concept of hope.[9] This does not necessarily mean that *spes quae* lies in the chronological future. Concerning this point, Ingolf Dalferth argues that "what is decisive is not that the hoped-for event lies in the future, but that the one who hopes does not know whether it is the case or not; it is

5 Whether *spes quae* may actually be considered an object can be disputed. For Godfrey, the hope for a certain object is not concerned with the existence of the object but rather for a certain relationship with that object. Therefore, he suggests that "it is preferable for clarity's sake… to understand the targets of hoping not as things but as states of affairs or events – not as objects, but as objectives." Joseph J. Godfrey, *A Philosophy of Human Hope* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), 11. This thesis holds that the broad range of what is hoped for does not necessarily exclude objects.

6 See Karl M. Woschitz, *Elpis, Hoffnung: Geschichte, Philosophie, Exegese, Theologie eines Schlüsselbegriffs* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1979), 4f.

7 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I–II, 40.1.

8 See Edmaier, *Horizonte der Hoffnung*, 74, 35–45.

9 Edmaier, *Horizonte der Hoffnung*, 35–39. Edmaier gives a detailed historical account of this future content in hope.

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about *epistemic uncertainty* instead of the *futurity* of what is hoped for."[10] However, when time is not conceived chrono-metrically, it is still reasonable to argue that *spes quae* lies in the future-mode of temporality. This future-mode can be expressed, for example, in Ernst Bloch's ontology of not-yet-being,[11] that is, "of reality not yet fully ontologically constituted, immanently pointing toward its future," as Slavoj Žižek summarizes.[12] Moreover, it can also find expression in the open temporality that Otto Bollnow describes.[13] This open temporality offers a horizon of unforeseeable possibilities, within which *spes quae* becomes unpredictable gifts of the future instead of an object that is subordinate to a subject. In this case, it is *spes quae* that comes to the one who hopes, instead of the one who hopes projecting one's own future or estimating the probability of the *spes quae*.

Second, what is hoped for is a *good*. In this sense, hope is neither expectation nor fear. Whereas expectation can be indifferent to the goodness of what is expected, and fear is always a fear of something bad, hope is unambiguously directed to the good. The goodness of *spes quae* can be understood as something pleasant and desirable for the one who hopes without moral considerations. For example, it is possible that one may hope for the fulfillment of one's own aim at the cost of another's suffering. Moreover, it can also be understood as a final positive prospect or salvation.[14] In this sense, the meaning of its goodness not only includes the moral good but also goes beyond what the moral good can bear.

Third, what is hoped for is characterized by *uncertainty*. When understood epistemologically, the uncertainty of *spes quae* lies in the subjective estimation of objective probability. In this case, *spes quae* is estimated as something that is difficult but in principle possible to obtain. On the one hand, if one could easily get what one desires, then one does not need to hope but rather to plan for it. On the other hand, what one desires should not be so difficult that one knows for sure that one will definitely not achieve it. That is to say that despite the difficulty, one is still able to obtain the thing one hopes for. In this case, *spes quae* is neither under total control nor radically out of control, both cases would lead to the dissolving of hope.

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10 Dalferth, *Hoffnung*, 37. Emphasis added. Therefore, Dalferth also holds that "the characteristic of futurity is neither sufficient nor necessary for what one can hope." Dalferth, *Hoffnung*, 37.

11 Ernst Bloch, *Philosophische Grundfragen. 1. Zur Ontologie des Noch-Nicht-Seins* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1961).

12 Slavoj Žižek, "Preface: Bloch's Ontology of Not-yet-Being," in *The Privatization of Hope: Ernst Bloch and the Future of Utopia*, ed. Peter Thompson and Slavoj Žižek (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 1–20, xvi.

13 Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit*, 75f.

14 Edmaier points out that this orientation to the good in this sense is a biblical inheritance. See Edmaier, *Horizonte der Hoffnung*, 39ff.

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Moreover, the uncertainty can also be understood in the open "realm of somehow." In this case, *spes quae* may be completely outside of the ability or even the imagination of the one who hopes. The uncertainty of *spes quae* in this sense implies that between the one who hopes and what is hoped for, there is always a realm of "somehow (*Hof des Irgendwie*)."[15] For example, a patient who hopes to be cured of his or her disease may not understand the details of the cure, but he or she hopes that the doctor can *somehow* cure his disease with his expertise. Furthermore, this uncertainty implies that *spes quae* is always something more than what one can grasp or even imagine. In this respect, *spes quae* is no longer subject to an "act-and-object" structure,[16] but always has an "external factor" that is more decisive than the objects of hope, as Ariel Meirav observes.[17]

So understood, *spes quae* can be rephrased as a desirable good plus something more. In hope, the best of what can be hoped for may be imagined from the situation of the one who hopes, but there can always be *more* than what is concretely imagined and what is supposed to be done to reach it. To push this logic further, *spes quae* can also be radically understood as nothing other than this "more" when every concrete *spes quae* fails. Conceived in this way, *spes quae* opens up a horizon that can never be closed by any concrete strategy, individual effort, or even any imagination. In this sense, it is both a negation of every concrete *spes quae* – a "hope against hope," and a positive disclosure of the superabundance of Being. It is precisely in this "more" that the objective side of hope reaches an ontological depth. In this open horizon, the good in *spes quae* is no longer a fixed object or goal but becomes the possibility of the good. It points to something more than we can achieve, plan, foresee, or even imagine, and points to the superabundance of Being which is no longer merely mine.

Finally, there remains one meaningful question on the objective side of hope, that is, can *spes quae* be another person? Furthermore, it can be asked whether one can hope for a person in the same way as one hopes for a concrete object, or in what sense is another person a *spes quae*?

One can hope for a cup of water in a time of thirst as well as hope that someone might bring him or her some water; it seems that these two examples are very similar, and that a cup of water has the same function as a person who might bring the water. In this case, the person is reduced to a water-bringer. Similar to this example is the case of a patient hoping to be somehow cured by the doctor. In this case, the doctor can be understood as a means towards *spes quae* or as an external factor.

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15 Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit*, 74.

16 For the act-and-object structure see Godfrey, *A Philosophy of Human Hope*, 14.

17 Meirav, *The Nature of Hope*.

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However, as Dalferth points out, "when I put hope in my doctor… my hope is directed *to* him, not to something specific that he will do in order to heal me, since I do not know what that might be. Not *what* he does, but that *he* does this, is the object of my hope."[18] In this sense, Dalferth insists that personal hope is a "hope-in," which should be distinguished from the propositional "hope that…;"[19] the former emphasizing a trust in that person, while the latter focusing solely on my own desire and takes other persons only as a function or external factor.[20]

Moreover, in personal hope, when the trust is not restricted to the competence of the doctor and is directed towards the whole person, hope becomes communal, which implies a loving relationship. In this sense, it is no longer proper to put the other person in the category of *spes quae*. As will be introduced in next chapter, it requires the intersubjective ontology suggested by Marcel. Marcel argues that the *spes quae* of such hope is not the fulfillment of a particular wish or desire on the part of an individual but rather the indestructible living communion.

1.1.2 The Subjective Side of Hope

The subjective side of hope is "*spes, qua speratur*," which refers to the process of hope and the human potential for hope itself. In this category, hope may be understood as a mental state and be allocated to a specific region of the mind, such as affection, conation, and cognition.[21] Moreover, it can also refer to the practice of hope. When hope is understood as a good act or quality that contributes to human excellence, it becomes a virtue. Finally, in existential phenomenology, it can also be seen as an existential possibility.

As a mental state, hope is seen to be situated in the region of affection as a passion of the soul, in the region of conation as wish or will, and in the region of cognition as the calculation of probability or anticipatory consciousness. However, these three regions should not be seen as clearly separated; in the phenomenon of hope, they are intertwined with one another, and each of them emphasizes only one of the subjective elements of hope respectively. Neither is hope as a mental state separated from hope as practice; it is not merely wishful feeling or thinking, but act-motivating. In some cases, hope takes the form of self-transformation or transcendence, which concerns the whole being of the one who hopes so that it is meaningless to ask whether hope is a mental state or an act.

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18 Dalferth, *Hoffnung*, 46.

19 Dalferth, *Hoffnung*, 43f., 169.

20 In this sense, Dalferth points out that propositional hope and personal hope follow different logics; the former should be understood within the structure of desire, and the latter in the structure of trust. See Dalferth, *Hoffnung*, 43, 62.

21 See Joseph J. Godfrey, *A Philosophy of Human Hope* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), 15.

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For example, in the well-known account of hope in analytical philosophy, hope "consists in desire combined with the assignment of probability."[22] In this sense, hope is a state between the cognitive conviction and the conative wish.[23] That is to say, hope can neither be understood as a pure wish, desire, or will, nor as a pure aimed desiderative-calculative form of hope; the unbalanced emphasis on the former leads to the problem of false hope, while a stress on the latter leads to a plan instead of hope.

The cognitive and conative aspects are also integrated in Bloch's theory of anticipatory consciousness and *docta spes*. For Bloch, hope is not merely an emotion but essentially "a directing act of a cognitive kind."[24] This cognitive act will not result in a closed system of knowledge that already exists but is characterized by "venturing beyond" and "not-yet-conscious." In contrast to the unconscious that is driven by libido in a psychoanalytic sense, "not-yet-conscious" is driven by hunger, which highlights the conative aspect of hope.

However, Bollnow criticizes Bloch's central position in *docta spes*, in which human being bears all responsibility for the future and can realize the future with the power of will and the insight of understanding. Regarding such position, Bollnow argues that knowledge and hope cannot be mingled with each other into one "knowing hope (*wissende Hoffnung*)," and that "only beyond what is perceived in the clarity of intellect and what is reached in the power of will can a realm be opened up, in which true hope is legitimate and necessary at the same time."[25] In this sense, hope always has an element of *pathos*, which is revealed in the affective aspect of *spes qua*.

As an emotion, hope is usually marginalized by Western early modern rationalism. For example, Descartes treats hope as a passion of the soul among others without special importance,[26] and Spinoza defines hope as "nothing but *an inconstant joy which has arisen from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt.*"[27] In phenomenology, hope is no longer understood as an emotional state

22 Meirav calls this account of hope the Standard Account. See Meirav, *The Nature of Hope*, 217.

23 See Sabine A. Döring, "Was Darf Ich Hoffen?," in *Theologie Der Gefühle*, ed. Roderich Barth and Christopher Zarnow (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 61–75, 62, and Godfrey, *A Philosophy of Human Hope*, 32.

24 Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), 10.

25 Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit*, 83.

26 For Descartes, hope is a desire that usually occurs together with anxiety. When hope becomes strong and entirely excludes anxiety, it becomes confidence; and when anxiety becomes so strong that it entirely excludes hope, it becomes despair. See René Descartes, "The Passions of the Soul," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol I*, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 325–405, 389.

27 Baruch Spinoza, *The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume 1*, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 505.

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in the black box of *psyché*. The phenomenological discussions of attunement (*Stimmung*)[28] and the more recent discussions of atmosphere[29] subvert the traditional understanding of emotion as an individual private state of the soul. In light of these phenomenological insights, hope can be conceived as either a basic attunement that discloses our existential situation or as an atmosphere that pours out in our bodily present sphere. In this sense, the hopeful feeling can also be rephrased as an *existential feeling* or *cosmic feeling*, which is more than just a psychological feeling.[30]

This phenomenological understanding also opens the door to understanding hope in a radical sense. From this perspective, hope is neither caused by a specific concrete object nor even related to an objective side, but becomes instead an "objectless expectancy," which can be expressed as "I am hopeful" in an intransitive sense.[31] For example, when a doctor announces that the disease of the patient is incurable, despite this desperate situation and a seemingly dead-end, the patient can still retain his or her hope and says, "although, medically speaking, there is no cure for my disease, I remain hopeful." Understood as a hope for the cure of this disease regardless of all the empirical evidence, this hope could be regarded as identical to superficial optimism, claiming naïvely that things will turn out better no matter how bad the situation is right now. However, understood as a basic attunement (*Grundstimmung*), hope is no longer a merely subjective feeling or attitude but concerns the human being as a whole and human being with an intrinsic link with a bearing reality.

In Marcel's phenomenology of hope, this intransitive meaning of hope is also expounded, not in terms of an existential or cosmic feeling, but in terms of a transcendent act of "I hope." However, when hope is understood as an act, it must face the question raised by Dalferth, namely, what do we do when we hope?[32] The act of hope can be understood as a passive waiting that fails to recognize the right

28 See, for example, Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §29, and Otto F. Bollnow, *Das Wesen der Stimmungen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009).

29 See, for example, Hermann Schmitz, *Atmosphären* (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2014), Gernot Böhme, *Atmosphäre: Essays zur neuen Ästhetik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), Tonino Griffero, *Atmospheres: Aesthetics of Emotional Spaces*, trans. Sarah De Sanctis (London: Routledge, 2014), and Tonino Griffero, *Quasi-Things: The Paradigm of Atmospheres*, trans. Sarah De Sanctis (Albany: SUNY Press, 2017). Chapter 4 of this thesis presents a more detailed introduction of the concept of atmosphere.

30 For an explanation of existential feeling see Matthew Ratcliffe, "What Is It to Lose Hope?," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 12, no. 4 (December 2013): 597–614. And the understanding of hope as a cosmic feeling see Godfrey, *A Philosophy of Human Hope*, 35.

31 See Godfrey, *A Philosophy of Human Hope*, 34f.

32 See Dalferth, *Hoffnung*, 169.

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